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lNJUNCTIONs-PowER OF A CouRT TO MoDIFY A FrNAL PERMANENT, INJUNCTION-A court which has issued a permanent injunction
may, under certain conditions, open and modify or dissolve 1 the injunction even though the decree in the original action has become final. 2
This power is said to be justified by the continuing operation of the
injunction, which regulates future conduct as well as determining the
rights of the parties as of the date of rendition of the decree. 8 The same

1 "Modify'' and "modification" will be used here to apply both to a change in
terms and to a complete dissolution. Cases on dissolution of temporary injunctions
have frequently been cited as authority on modification of permanent injunctions,
but they are obviously not in point,
·
2 I FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, § 253 (1925); 4 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, § 943,
comment (e) (1939); United States v. Swift and Co., 286 U.S. 106, 52 S. Ct. 460
(19g2); 86 A.L.R. 1180 (1930), 136 A.L.R. 770 (1944); Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union v. Meadowmoor Dl!iries, 3u. U.S. 287 at 298, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941). There
are early cases to the contrary but these seem to have fallen into discard: Bloss v.
Tacke, 59 Mo. 174 (1875); Wof£enden v. Woffenden, 1 Ariz. 328, 25 P. 666
(1876); People_v. Gold Run Ditch and Mining Co., 66 Cal. 155, 4 P. n50 (1884).
A decree is usually considered final when the term at which it was issued
has expired and the time for appeal has passed. Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U.S. 410
( I 881). Some courts apply the historic principle of Chancery practice that the
common-law term rules do not apply to equity, and in these jurisdictions finality
would be· determined solely by the expiration of the time for appeal and rehearing,
Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 148 A. 699 ( 1930), or by enrollment or equivalent
procedure, Hudson Trust Co. v. Boyd, So N.J. Eq. 267, 84 A. 715 (1912).
8 Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 148 A. 699 (1930); Lowe v. Prospect Hill
Cemeteiy Association, 75 Neb. 85, 106 N.W. 429 (1905).
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proposition can be restated by saying that injunctions are issued to protect existing rights, but provide no immunity against modification of
those rights because of later changes in the appiicable law or the essential facts.
It should be recalled that almost all judicial proceedings may be
. attacked at any time for such reasons as fraud, mistake, or duress.4
Equity decrees, furthermore, are subject to reveision by bill of review 11
or bill in the nature of a bill of review 6 in extraordinary situations.
These equitable remedies have a long and confused history, and their
limits under modern practice are highly uncertain. However, recent
cases have defined grounds for modification and vacation of permanent
injunctions entirely apart from the bill of review and bill in the nature
of a bill of review.
-

.

A. The Continuing Power of the Court over Injunctive Decrees
After an injunction has been issued, the court's control over the ·
case and the parties does not come to a complete end. If the defendant
violates the terms of the injunction he may be punished criminally for
contempt, and damages which the plaintiff sustains because of the violation may be recovered in a civil contempt proceeding. 1 It has been held
that these civil contempt proceedings are a part of the principal suit
rather than being separate proceedings, and that formal service of process is not necessary to initiate a contempt action because the court re4
These situations suffice to permit dissolution of injunctions. Jellen v. O'Brien,
89 Cal. App. 505, 264 P. n15 (1928) and Shuford
Cain, (D.C. Ga. 1869) u
Fed. Cas. No. 12823 (want of jurisdiction); Kaw Valley Drainage District v. Union
Pacific Railway, (C.C.A. 8th, 1908) 163 F. 836 and Bono v. Orlow, 147 Ga. 388,
94 S.E. 251 (1917) (mistake). The appropriate procedure is bill in the nature of
a bill of review, which can be filed without leave of the court. I WHITEHOUSE,
EQUITY PRACTICE,.§ 151 (1915).
5 Two situations were recognized in which bill of review could be had. The bill
could be brought without leave of the court for "error apparent" in the original decree,
and with leave of the court for "new matter" or newly discovered evidence. 1 WHIT~HousE, EQUITY PRACTICE, §§ 143-146 (1915); 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3264
(1938); 59 HARV. L. REv. 957 (i946). Doctrines of modification necessarily had
to be developed without the aid of the bill of review, first, because of holdings that
"newly discovered evidence" was held to be only such evidence as was in existence at
the time of the original decree, and did not include subsequent changes in conditions;
and, second, because of rulings that changes in law subsequent to the granting of the
original decree did not constitute "error apparent." Scotten v. Littlefield, 235 U.S.
407, 35 S. Ct. 125 (1914); Franz v. City of Philadelphia, 333 Pa. 220, 3 A. (2d)
. 917 (1939), 59 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1946).
6
Note 4, supra.
1 Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co. v. Leman, (C.C.A. 1st, 1931) 50- F. (2d)
699, affirmed, Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 52 S. Ct.
238 (1932).

v:
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tains the jurisdiction which it obtained on the commencement of the
original equity suit.8 Under this doctrine a case in which an injunction
has been granted remains before the court to some extent so long as the
injunction continues in force.
Equity courts may experiment with remedies. A court may provide
in its decree that control is to be retained and may use processes of
trial and error in, search for an adequate remedy.9 This continuing
jurisdiction for the purpose of giving effective relief has many applications. The original decree may be totally inadequate for the protection of the plaintiff's rights, and if so it may be made more stringent.10
If a defendant persists in conduct of the same general sort as that prohibited by an earlier injunction, but not clearly within the prohibitions
of the decree, the court may grant a supplemental injunction _extending
the force of the original order to cover the new transgressions.11 One
cannot be held in contempt of a decree which is so indefinite that he
cannot reasonably ascertain the commands of the court,12 but if a defendant is discharged for this reason the decree may be clarified so as
to protect the rights of the plaintiff.13 A party who is in doubt about
his rights and duties under an injunction may apply for construction
8

Pitt v. Davison, 37 N.Y. 235 (1867); Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co. v.
Leman, (C.C.A. 1st, 1931) 50 F. (2d) 699, affirmed, Leman v. Krentler-Arnold
Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 52 S. Ct. 238 (1932). Compare Whitlock Cordage
Co. v. Hine, 125 Md. 96 at 109, 93 A. 431 (1915), suggesting that bill of review
requires merely notice to the attorney of record of the other party. A contrary conclusion as to service is suggested in Cobbs v. City of New Orleans, 153 La. u9, 95
s. 423 (1923).9 See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U.S. 184 at 206, 42
S. Ct. 72 (1921); Adams v. Local 400, 124 Wash. 564, 215 P. 19 (1923).
10
In Holloway v. Peoples' Water Co., 100 Kan. 414, 167 P. 265 (1917), an
injunction directing defendant to use due care lest plaintiff's land be flooded was
modified so as to impose an absolute prohibition on defendant against flooding when
the floods continued but no negligence could be shown. Compare Chrysler Corp. v.
United States, 316 U.S. 556, 62 S. Ct. II46 (1942).
11
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has approved this procedure in patent cases. Read Manufacturing Co. v. Jaburg, (C.C.A. 2d, 1915) 223
F. 1022; Armstrong v. De Forest Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1926) IO F. (2d) 727. Compare
Lennox Furniture Co. v. Wrot Iron ~eater Co., 181 Iowa 1331, 160 N.W. 356 ,
(1916),, involving the extension of a decree against unfair competition. The third
federal circuit has refused to sanction this procedure. Minerals Separation, Ltd. v.
Miami Copper Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1920) 269 F. 265; Prang Co. v. American Crayon
Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1932) 58 F. (2d) 715.
12
Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 222 Pa. 72, 70 A. 775 (1908).
18
ln Evans v. Stinchcomb, 180 Md. 482, 25 A. (2d) 444 (1942), the original
decree enjoined defendant from planting oysters so as to interfere with plaintiff, and
in a contempt action this wording was held too indefinite. The decree was then modified so as to specify the areas within which oysters could not be planted. Compare
Uservo, Inc. v. Selking, 217 Ind. 567, 28 N.E. (2d) 61 (1940).

2,44
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or modification. 14 Inadvertent errors in framing have been corrected
on application.15
The continuation of injunction actions before the courts carries
with it other powers in addition to the power to enforce and the power
to mold further relief as necessary. The court necessarily has the power
to interpret its decree, and what is to all intents and purposes a modification may be effected by means of interpretation.16 The court may
mitigate its decree by declining to punish for contempt or by inflicting
merely nominal punishment.17 Moreover, express modifications may
be decreed, as is shown by many recent cases. This power does not
depend on express reservation of control,18 although a reservation may
permit greater discretion.19
14
Patten v. Miller, 190 Ga: 152, 8 S.E. (2d) 786 (1940). But in Ladner v.
Siegel, 294 Pa. 368, 144 A. 274 (1928), defendant was denied' a declaratory judgment defining his rights.
·
15
In Golden v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. App. 734, 161 P. 758 (1916), the
dispute in the original case was as to whether defendant was owner or pledgee, and
an injunction was granted prohibiting any sale whatsoever by him. This injunction
was modified so as to allow defendant the power of sale of a pledgee.
16
Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 222 Pa. 72, 70 A. 775 (1908); De
Florez v. Raynolds, (C.C. N.Y. 1880) 8 F. 434; Tosh v. West Kentucky Coal Co.,
(C.C.A. 6th, 1918) 252 F. 44, involving the application of a labor injunction to a
subsequent dispute over a different subject after the settlement of the original suit;
Ex parte Myers, 246 Ala. 460, 21 S. (2d) 113 -(1945), in which an injunction was
held not to apply to a situation apparently within its terms but not contemplated by the
parties or the court at the original hearing and causing no harm to plaintiff.
17
In National Labor Relations Board v. Federal Bearings Co., (C.C.A. 2d,
1940) 109 F. (2d) 945, employees ordered to be rehired were discovered by defendant to be ex-convicts after the order had issued. In Radio Corporation of America
v. Cable Radio Tube Corporation, (C.C.A. 2d, 1931) 66 F. (2d) 778, the court held
that a patent injunction was suspended during a period for which plaintiff licensed
defendant to manufacture the ·patented article.
18 Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 148 A. 699 (1930), 68 A.L.R. 1180 (1930);
Santa Rita Oil Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 112 Mont. 359, 116 P. (2d) 1012
(1941), 136 A.L.R. 782 (1942). Sometimes an appellate court will order words of
retention inserted. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 33 S. Ct. 729 (1913);
Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177, 54 S. Ct. 138 (1933); West Texas
Utilities Co. v. City of Spur, (C.C.A. 5th, 1930) 38 F. (2d) 466. This practice is
recommended in 4 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, § 943 (e) (1939), in a case in which
modification is possible. Other courts have declined to order words retaining
jurisdiction inserted on the ground that they are surplusage. Ward v. Prospect Manor
Association, 188 Wis. 534, 206 N.W. 856 (1926); Seaboard Rendering Co. v. Con' Ion, 152 Fla. 723, 12 S. (2d) 882 (1943); Wise v. Potomac National Bank, 393
ill. 357, 65 N.E. (2d) 767 (1946).
19 The effect of words of retention is rendered somewhat doubtful by the decision
in United States v. Swift and Co., 286 U.S. 106, 52 S. Ct. 460 (1932), in which
the modification ordered by the lower court was reversed despite the presence of words
retaining jurisdiction and a sharp dispute as to the facts by the Justices of the Supreme
Court. A consent decree was involved.
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Numerous forms of procedure have been permitted by the courts
in modification cases. The procedure used depends to some extent on
whether the court considers a petition for modification a part of the
original suit or a separate proceeding. 20 Some courts have ordered modification on bill of review,21 or bill in the nature of a bill of review,22
and these presuppose the reopening of a final decree. If the modification is granted on original bill then there is a collateral attack, which
is normally allowed only in extraordinary situations and when the court
has no further power over the original proceeding.23 If the original
suit is thought of as still pending a motion 24 or an application for stay
in proceedings 25 cohld be used for modification. There seems to be no
agreement on a single, standard procedure.
It is settled that a defendant who is charged with contempt cannot
set up the propriety of modification as a defense, and cannot ask for
modification until he has purged himself of the contempt.20
In some cases it has been held that a final injunction which has been
decreed pursuant to the mandate of an appellate court cannot be reviewed without the consent of the higher court,21 but there is other
authority to the e:ff~ct that the court from which an injunction actually
issues can entertain proceedings for modification.28
20
In Reed v. Beczkiewicz, 215 Ind. 365 at 387, 18 N.E. (2d) 789 (1939)
there is a suggestion that the case continues before the court only for purposes of enforcement. The very existence of a power of modification, however, suggests that the
case remains pending for other purposes than this.
21 As in Terry v. Commercial Bank, 92 U.S. 454 (1875); Sawyer v. Davis, 136
Mass. 239 (1884). A bill of review for "new matter'' can be filed only with leave
of the court. Note 5, supra.
22
In International Railway Co. v. Davidson, (D.C.N.Y. 1945) 65 F. Supp. 58,
the court stated that bill in the nature of a bill of review was the historic procedure
and that an equivalent procedure was available under the Federal Rules.
28
Original bill was used in Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 190 A. 140 (1937);
American Press Association v. United States, (C.C.A. 7th, 1917) 245 F. 91; McGuinn v. City of High Point, 219 N.C. 56, 13 S.E. {2d) 48 (1941).
24
As in Wetmore v. Law, 34 Barb. (N.Y.) 515 (1860); People v. Bank of
Mendocino, 133 Cal. 107, 65 P. 124 (1901). The advantage of a procedure predictated on the assumption that the original case is still pending before the court is that
formal service might not be required. Note 8, supra.
25
As in Spann v. Spann, 2 Hill Eq. (S.C.) 152 (1835); Scudder v. Kilfoil, 57
N.J. Eq. 171, 40 A. 602 (1898).
26
Emergency Hospital v. Stevens, 146 Md. 159, 126 A. IOI (1924); Waterman
v. Standard Drug Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1913) 202 F. 167; Vulcan Detinning Co. v. St.
Clair, 315 Ill. 40, 145 N.E. 657 (1924); Ladner v. Siegel, ,z96 Pa. 579, 146 A.
710 (1929). See note 36, infra, for a discussion of situations in which a decree may
be held to be vacated "automatically."
21
Southard v. Russell, 16 How. (57 U.S.) 547 (1853) regarding bill of review; Mays v. Burgess, (App. D.C. 1945y 152 F. (2d) 123.
28
Boston v. Santosuosso, 308 Mass. 189, 31 N.E. (2d) 564 (1941).
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The balance of this comment concerns two classes of cases in which
modifications have been ordered: (I) those in which the applicable
law has changed; and (2) those in which there has been such a change
in the conditions attendant upon the issuance of the injunction that
modification is appropriate.

B. Change in Law
I. Legislation and administrative regulations. One of the clearest
cases for modification of an equity injunction arises when t.lie defendant
can show subsequent legislative authority permitting the conduct forbidden him by the court. In one type of case an act is passed declaring
that the practices enjoined are no longer illegal. 29 In another the act is•
special, conferring· authority on a particular person which was previously wanting.30 The legislative authority might come from a referendum. 31 Similar situations arise when the defendant can show as a basis
for modification a valid administrative order,32 the grant of a franchise, 88
or eminent domain. 84 If public or corporate action is enjoined because
of errors in procedure the defects can be corrected and modification
secured.85
•
A doctrine of automatic vacation has been advanced to cover cases
29
Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239 (1884), in which a statute permitted the
ringing of a factory bell at certain times after the defendant had been forbidden by
injunction to ring the bell; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, (C.C.A. 7th, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 955, in which a labor injunction was modified so as to conform to the Norris-La Guardia Act; Bartholomew
v. Town of Harwinton, 33 Conn. 408 (1866); Avon Township v. Detroit United
Railway, 211 Mich. 34, 177 N.W. 953 (1920); Hodges'v. Snyder, 45 S.D. 149,
186 N.W. 867 (1922), affirmed, 261 U.S. 600, 43 S.Ct. 435 (1923).
so Pennsylvania v. Wheeling-Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. (59 U.S.) 421
(1855); Newton Rubber Works v. De Las Casas, 198 Mass. 156, 84 N.E. 119 (1908).
No rights are created by an injunctive decree which cannot constitutionally be divested
by subsequent legislation or judicial decision. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 625 b;
Hodges v. Snyder, 45 S.D. 149, 186 N.W. 867 (1922), affirmed, 261 U.S. 600, 43
S.Ct. 435 (1923); Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 148 A. 699 (1939). Contra:
Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Krueger, 115 Wis. 150, 90 N.W. 458 (1902).
81
Williams v. Shoudy, 12 Wash. 362, 41 P. 169 (1895).
82
Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, (Tex. 1932) 52 S.W. (2d) 380; International
Union v. California State Brewers' Institute, (D.C. Cal. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 870.
88
Larson v. Minnesota and Northwestern Electric Railway Co., 136 Minn. 423,
16,2 N.W. 523 (1917).
84
Weaver v. Mississippi and Rum River Boom Company, 30 Minn. 477, 16 N.W.
269 (1883}; Watson v. Metropolitan Electric Railway Co., 57 N.Y. Super. 364, 8
N.Y.S. 533 (1890); Southern California Railway v. Southern Pacific Railway Co,.
(Cal. 1896) 43 P. 1123.
85
Emergency Hospital v. Stevens, 146 Md. 159, 126 A. IOI (1937); Kelley
v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 190 A. 140 (1937); Washington Water Power Company v. City of Cour d'Alene, (D.C. Idaho 1938) 24 F. Supp. 790, 25 F. Supp. 795.
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in which defendant can show precise authority legalizing the enjoined
acts.80 Defendants have thereby been enabled to set up the curative
authority as a defense when called to answer for contempt of the original decree. The problem involved is not too serious if the authority
is clear and unequivocal. The court might find, however, that the
curative measures are unconstitutional, in excess of powers, or otherwise
invalid. If so the question is whether "reasonable reliance" by the defendant is a defense to contempt charges, and it is apparent that the
defendant undertakes a serious risk if he violates the terms of an injunction without applying to the court for modification.87
2. Change in judicial decisions. A court of last resort may reverse
a standing line of decisions, with the result that injunctions may exist
forbidding particular defendants to engage in conduct which according
to the latest judicial authority is perfectly legal. The case for modification is as clear here as when the basis is an act of the legislature, and
modifications have been freely permitted.88
36

•

The leading case is Pennsylvania v. Wheeling-Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How.
(59 U.S.) 421 (1855), involving express legislative authority to build a bridge. Other
cases in which definite curative authority was held to justify violation of the terms
of the injunction are Newton Rubber Works v. De Las Casas, 198 Mass. 156, 84
N.E. u9 (1908) and Avon Township v. Detroit United Railway, 2II Mich. 34,
177 N.W. 953 (1920). Compare Minegar v. Minneapolis Fire Department Relief
Association, 126 Minn. 332, 148 N.W. 279 (1914), in which defendant was held
not guilty of contempt for failing to make pension payments ordered by the court,
after the legislature had declared that persons in the class of plaintiff were not entitled to the benefits. Early cases denying the principle of automatic vacation are
Williamson v. Carnan, 1 Gill & Johnson (Md.) 184 (1826) and Muller v. Henry,
(C.C. Cal. 1879) 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9916. See also note 16, supra, for cases in which
the decree was construed so as to relieve defendants of the burdens of an injunction
even though apparently guilty of violation. Some cases suggest that injunction may
virtually expire when the rights protected no longer need protection, even though the
injunction purports to be "perpetual." De Florez v. Raynolds, (C.C. N.Y. 1880) 8
F. 434; People v. Bank of Mendocino, 133 Cal. 107, 65 P. 124 (1901). Automatic
vacation may also be effected to the extent that plaintiff licenses defendant to conduct
operations contrary to the terms of the injunction. See note 49, infra.
37
In Carr v. District Court, 147 Iowa 663 at 676, 126 N.W. 791 (1910), it
was suggested that such reasonable reliance might be a defense even though the
authority relied on should be ineffective. In Muller v. Henry, (C.C. Cal. 1879) 17
Fed. Cas. No. 9916, the court indicated that any risk as to the validity of the authority
would be on the defendant.
88
Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 148 A. 699 (1930), in which the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania had altered its concept of nuisance; Santa Rita Oil Co. v. State
Board of Equalization, II2 Mont. 359, II6 P. (2d) 1012 (1941), ordering modification after the Supreme Court of the United States made broad changes in the doctrines of tax immunity of lessees of federal lands; Sontag Chain Stores v. Superior
Court, 18 Cal. (2d) 92, II3 P. (2d) 689 (1941), in which a labor injunction was
modified after the Supreme Court of the United States gave increased protection to
the constitutional right of peaceful picketing. There are early federal cases in which
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In another type of case a defendant against whom an injunction
is sought either fails to appeal from an adverse decision or else submits .
to a consent decree. Later, and in a separate case, a higher court hands
gown a decision indicating that the injunction was granted in error.
Mere error will not suffice to allow reopening of a settled proceeding,
and a defendant who fails to appeal will not be able to secure a reversal
after the time for appeal and rehearing has expired.39 These rules, in
general, apply to injunctions 40 as well as to other proceedings. A relitigation will usually not be permitted for error alone,41 and such
error does not serve to excuse a contempt.42 Yet there is an incongruity
in perpetuating a restraint not warranted by law, and a showing of error
in the original decree may strengthen a petition for modification. 48

C. Modification because of Changed Factual Conditions
It is possible that a court will grant modification of an injunction
if the defendant can show that its continued enforcement will be inequitable because of a change in essential facts subsequent to the rendition of the decree. The problem here is the kind of showing to be
requirdd of the defendant before modification will be permitted, and
the reliance which plaintiffs and their privies can place on an injunction which on its face purports to be :final and permanent.
federal courts applying state law have refused to modify decrees even though the
state supreme court had handed down a decision subsequent to the decree indicating
a different view of the state law from that adopted by the federal court. City of
Frankfort v. Deposit Bank of Frankfort, (C.C.A. 6th, 1903) 124 F. 18; 59 HARV. L.
REV. 957 (1946).
89
Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 284 U.S. 547, 52 S.Ct. 215 (1932).
40
In Lehman Co. v. Appleton Toy and Furniture Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1945) 148
F. (2d) 988, and Natio~al Popsicle Corp. v. Hughes, (D.C. Cal. 1940) 32 F. Supp.
397, injunctions against patent infringement were not modified even though the
patents involved were later declared invalid by higher courts in suits against different
defendants.
41
Lowe v. Prospect Hill Cemetary Association, 75 Neb. 85, 106 .N.W. 429
(1905); United States v. Swift and Co., 286 U.S. 106, 52 S.Ct. 460 (1932).
42
United States v. United Mine Workers of America, (U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct. 677.
48
In Coca-Cola Company v. Standard Bottling Co., (D.C. Colo. 1942) 50 F.
Supp. 201, affirmed, (C.C.A. 10th, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 788, consent decree was
modified because of holdings of many courts that plaintiff could not protect "cola" as
a trade name. The situation here seems to parallel that in the cases cited in note 40,
supra, on patents later held invalid; but the significant difference is apparently that
'a large number of manufacturers were producing "cola" drinks while no such wide
use was made of the patent rights later held to be invalid. In Jackson Grain Co. v.
Lee, 139 Fla. 93, 190 S. 464 (1939), same case, 150 Fla. 232, 7 S. (2d) 143 (1942),
the court held that error in an injunction against the collection of a tax could be
corrected when discovered in spite of failure to exhaust remedies of appeal, because
of the importance of the pubilc interest involved; but ·a contrary conclusion was
reached in Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Henneford, 199 Wash. 462, 92
P. (2d) 214 (1939).
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In some cases the defendant can show a definite change in fact.
Injunctions enforcing restrictions on the use of land may be modified
if conditions in the vicinity so change that the purpose of the restrictions can no longer be carried out.44, An injunction against the enforcement of public utility rates prescribed by a regulatory commission, on
the ground that the rates are confiscatory, is necessarily based on facts
which are likely to change; and modification is in order if it can be
shown that the rate schedule is no longer confiscatory.45 A combination
of two printing companies was enjoined under the Sherman Act, but
the injunction was modified several years later when one of the companies became insolvent and the other appeared to be the only prospective purchaser.46 An injunction protecting homestead rights will
be modified when the property covered ceases to be used for a homestead/1 and a prohibitory injunction against a business facility on the
ground that it is a "nuisance per se" can be lifted if technological developments make it possible to carry on the business in an unobjectionable way.48 The plaintiff and defendant also might so adjust their
property interests that an injunction has no further purpose.49
44, Misch v. Lehman, 178 Mich. 225, 144 N.W. 556 (1913); Ward v. Prospect
Manor Corporation, 188 Wis. 534, 206 N.W. 856 (1926); Rulnick v. Shulman, 106
Conn. 66, 136 A. 865 (1927).
45
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 387 Ill. 256, 56 N.E.
(2d) 432 (1944).
46
American Press Association v. United States, (C.C.A. 7th, 1917) 245 F. 91.
7
4' Uvalde Paving Co. v. Kennedy, (Tex. 1929) 22 S.W. (2d) 1091.
48
Seaboard Rendering Co. v. Conlon, 152 Fla. 723, 12 S. (2d) 882 (1943).
49
In theory it would seem that the parties to a suit could not make arrangements
among themselves modifying the force of an injunction, because the injunction is an
order of the court and violation is an affront to the court which is punishable as a
criminal contempt. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, (U.S. 1947)
67 S. Ct. 677. ,It seems settled, however, that plaintiff might grant a license to defendant which would allow defendant to act in contravention of the decree and defendant will not be punished for contempt because the injunction is suspended to the
extent of the license. Radio Corporation of America v. Cable Radio Tube Corp.,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1933) 66 F. (2d) 778; Lewis Invisible Stitch Mach. Co. v. Popper,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1941) II8 F. (2d) 191. In Steinfur Patents Corp. v. Sterling Fur Dyers,
(D.C. N.Y. 1941) 40 F. (2d) 790> the court refused to decree modification to the
extent permitted by the license, holding that the license stayed the force of the injunction automatically. See note 36, supra. In Scudder v. Kilfoil, 57 N.J •. Eq. 171,
40 A. 602 (1898), the court held ·that the defendant lost no rights by granting a
license except those surrendered by the terms of the license, and that in other respects
the injunction remained in full force and effect. Other examples of the way in which
the conduct of the parties can effect a modification are cases in which punishment for
contempt is refused because of plaintiff's laches in bringing the· facts to the attention
of the court as in American Crayon Co. v. Prang Co., (D.C. Del. 1931) 51 F. (2d)
737, and cases in which plaintiff loses his right to an injunction against violation of
a negative covenant contained in a contract with defendant because he himself is guilty
of breach of contract, on which see Barnett Foundry Co. v. Iron Works Co., 85 N.J.
Eq. 359, 96 A. 490 (1915); Oregon Growers' Cooperative v. Lentz, 107 Ore. 561,
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In a recent New York case the defendant had been permanently
enjoined from dealing in securities except as a salesman for an authorized dealer. The proceeding was brought by the Attorney General
under the Martin Act,5° which authorizes this sort of relief -against
persons guilty of fradulent dealings. In I 946 defendant petitioned the
court for dissolution of the injunction, setting up as justification an ex.:.
- cellent personal record during the nine years the injunction had
been in force. The state argued that the petition was not in order because the time for appeal and rehearing had passed, but the court
declared that it had the power to order a modification if good cause
were shown. In the opinion it was emphasized that the original decree
had been entered only after full hearing, that the defendant could no
longer question the correctness of the original order, and that modification would be ordered only for strong and compelling reasons. The
matter was accordingly referred to an official referee for findings and
recommendations. 51
A similar problem was presented in the cases arising out of the
Chicago Milk Wagon Drivers' dispute. The Supreme Court of Illinois
•affirmed an injunction restraining union activities directed against a
dairy which had no dispute with its own employees but which sold milk
to non-union distributors, and enlarged the decree of the lower court
so as to forbid peaceful picketing on the ground that such a restriction
was necessary to protect the plaintiffs against violence. 52 The Supreme
Court of the United States affirmed,5 3 holding that the state court
could constitutionally enjoin even peaceful picketing if the court reason212 P. 811 (1923). Enforcement of injunctions will usually follow only if plaintiff
makes a complaint, unless defendant is guilty of conduct which could be called a
direct affront to the dignity of the court,
It is conceivable that there might be a substitution of parties even after an injunction decree has become final. Suppose plaintiff secures an injunction against
defendant's violation of restrictive building covenants and then plaintiff sells his interest in all land concerned to a third person. Plaintiff can no longer enforce the
injunction in civil contempt proceedings because he has no further interest to protect,
and it is doubtful that the court would seek to enforce it on its own initiative. The
purchaser might not be able to' get a separate injunction unless a threat against him
personally i;ould be shown, and even so he might be at a disadvantage if required to
relitigate the entire controversy. If the injunction suit is still pending before the
court, however, the purchaser might apply to have himself substituted as party plaintiff.
See 135 A.L.R. 325 at 358 (1941) and 149 A.L.R. 829 (1944) as to parties entitled
to be substituted and stages in proceedings at which substitution has been permitted.
50
19 N.Y. Cons!. Laws (Mc Kinney, 1941), General Business, §§ 352-359.
51 People v. Riley, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946) 64 N.Y.S. (2d) 348.
52 Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 371 Ill. 377, 21 N.E.
(2d) 308 (1939). Compare Local Union No. 858 v. Jiannas, (Ark. 1947) 200
S.W. (2d) 763.
.
58 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 61 S.
Ct. 552 (1941).
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ably determined that such restraint was necessary in order to control
violence. The court asserted, however, that the injunction could be
modified and that inasmuch as the right of free speech could not be
forfeited because of a record of past violence the Illinois courts would
be compelled by the Supreme Court of the United States to grant
modification if a proper case therefor were presented.5i
It is hard to see just what change in conditions the Supreme Court
had in mind when it declared that it might compel the Illinois courts
to grant modification in the future. There is some authority to the
effect that labor injunctions are limited to the immediate controversy
.otlt of which they arise and that new and independent disputes coming
up after the original incident has been settled are not within their
scope; 1111 but such a holding is more like a construction of the original
decree than a modification. The Supreme Court must have thought
that modification should be ordered as soon as the danger of violence
ceased, and probably the only evidence of lessened danger would be
the passing of a period of time without violent incidents. If this is so,
the showing required of defendants in the MeadowmoRr case is very
much like the allegation of the defendant in the Martin Act case.116
Yet some restrictions must be imposed if equity decrees are to retain
any attributes of finality under familiar doctrines of res judicata. In
one of the first cases asserting an inherent power to modify, the de.cree
of the lower court ordering modification was reversed on the ground
that defendant was merely trying to relitigate the issues of the original
action by setting up a frivolous claim of changed circumstances.111 A
plaintiff in whose favor an injunction has been issued has the right to
114

Id. at 299.
See Tosh v. West Kentucky Coal Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1918) 252 F. 44. The
· case had to do with a contempt action against non-parties, and the application of the
principle parties was not within the scope of the decision. The language used by
the court suggests, however, that an injunction against a strike is by its nature
limited in scope. In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, (C.C.A. 7th, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 955, in which an injunction
issued in a labor dispute nearly twenty years earlier was apparently considered still to
be in force except to the extent that the Norris-LaGuardia Act required modification.
116
People v. Riley, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946) 64 N.Y.S. (2d) 346. In one of the
cases arising out of the Milk Wagon Drivers' Dispute a modi.fication was granted and
affirmed. Maywood Farms v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 313 Ill. App. 24, 38
N.E. (2d) 972 (1942). The appellate court suggested that intervening decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States compelled the modification. Yet in the same
case further violence occurred and the order adjudging modification was dissolved,
leaving the original injunction still in force. Maywood Farms v. Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union, 316 Ill. App. 47, 43 N.E. (2d) 700 (1942). The decision in this case suggests
that any modification may be set aside in the same way that it is granted.
117
Lowe v. Prospect Hill Cemetery Association, 75 Neb. 85, 106 N.W. 429
(1905), rehearing, 75 Neb. 100, 108 N.W. 978 (1906).
1111
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have it continued, after it has become final, until a proper case for
modification is presented. 58 The principle of res judicata protects him
to this extent. The Supreme Court of the United States has called for
a "clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions." 59 A decree of a lower court adjudging modification will be
examined closely on appeal, and there is obvious danger of reversal
unless the record shows substantial ground for the decision.00 The continuing control of the court fo:i; purposes of modification is closely confined. Both in the Meadowmoor case and the Martin Act case, discussed
above, there is great difficulty in showing tangible grounds for modification. In both of these cases the defendants are relegated to arguing
that the passing of time without the abuses which caused the injunction
to issue indicates that the danger of recurrence is slight.
These cases can be justified if we agree that a defendant is entitled
to a modification when he can show, first, that an injunction places a
severe· burden on him, and, second, that the plaintiff is no longer entitled to injunctive relief under the conditions prevailing when µiodification is askei for.
_
.
If an injunction is of no substantial value to the plaintiff the defendant should be relieved of its burdens on a comparatively slight
showing of hardship.61 Injunctions protecting "cola" as a trade-name
of the Coca-Cola Company have been modified on the ground that
· introduction of numerous other "cola" drinks deprived the plaintiff
of a sufficient interest inthe name. 62 Nor is there any reason to continue
58

The original issues cannot be relitigated, and the defendant cannot secure
modification merely by showing that the injunction would not have been issued under
the conditions prevailing at the time when modification is sought. State ex. rel.
Caplow v. Kirkwood, {Mo. 1938) II7 S.W. {2d) 652; Hempstead v. Meadville
Theological School, 346 Pa. 276, 29 A. (2d) 509 (1943). If sound reasons remain
to support the original decree, a change in some of the material circumstances will not
suffice as a basis for modification. Degenhart v. Harford, 59 Ohio App. 552, 18 N.E.
{2d) 990 (1938); Fleming v. Miller, (D.C. Minn. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 1004.
59
United States v. Swift and Co., 286 U.S. 106 at II9, 52 S. Ct. 460 (1932).
The relevancy-of this decision to the subject discussed here might be questioned because
the case involved a consent decree, but the court in its opinion, pp. 114-II5, stated
that the power to modify was the same for all decrees whether entered by consent or
not. On the power to modify consent decrees, see Coca-Cola Co. v. Standard Bottling
Works, (C.C.A. 10th, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 788. Chrysler Corporation v. United
States, 316 U.S. 556, 62 S. Ct. u46 (1942); 17 RocKY MT. L. REv. II4 (1944).
60
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, (C.C.A. 7th, 1943) 133 F. {2d) 955, reversing an order dissolving a
labor injunction issued nearly twenty years earlier on the ground that nothing in the
record showed that the danger of violence had ceased to exist.
61
In People v. Bank of Mendocino, 133 Cal. 107, 65 P. 124 (190~), and International Railway Co. v. Davidson, {D.C. N.Y. 1945) 65 F. Supp. 58, the injunctions
had become entirely unnecessary to protect the rights of the plaintiffs.
62
See Coca-Cola Co. v. Standard Bottling Works, (D.C. Colo. 1942) 50 F.
Supp. 201, affirmed, (C.C.A. 10th, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 788.
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an mJunction against a particular manufacturer's infringement of a
patent which is later held invalid by a higher court in an independent
case, for the effect of continuing the injunction would be to allow everybody in the world to make the article involved except the single defendant who failed to appeal.68
The ease with which modification will be permitted likewise varies
with the importance of the activities of the defendant which are restrained. A defendant who had been enjoined from throwing stones
onto his neighbor's land would have gre_at difficulty with a claim that
inasmuch as several years had passed without the throwing of stones
the injunctive restraint should be dissolved. 64 On the other hand, restrictions of freedom of speech, as in the Meadownioor case,65 or interference with one's right to carry on his usual business, as in the Martin
Act case,66 are such severe hindrances that a petition for modification
should be received more favorably. The court is justified in ordering
modification if it feels that the danger of violations is so lessened that
further injunctive restraint is unnecessary. The injunctions in both of
these cases go beyond the wrongful acts complained of. Fraudulent
dealing in securities led to a prohibition of all sales,67 and a record of
violence in a labor dispute resulted in the restriction of all picketing.
Another case involving important rights is one in which the collection
of a tax has been enjoined. The public taxing authorities should not
be embarrassed by an injunction if the tax which has been enjoined is
ultimately found to be valid, even though the injunctive decree has
become final. 68
63
A contrary conclusion was reached in National Popsicle Corp. v. Hughes,
(D.C. Cal. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 397 and Lehman Co. v. Appleton Toy and Furniture
Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 988. The reason given was that modification
would constitute reversal for mere error. If the injunction is allowed to remain in
force, however, plaintiff receives a continuing benefit to which he is not entitled by
law.
64
In Koppelman v. Sunset Wine Co., 180 Misc. 812, 44 N.Y.S. (2d) 225
(1943), modification of an injunction against certain sales of liquor by defendant was
denied even though he was able to show wartime restrictions under federal authority
which constituted good justification. Defendant failed to show, however, that he
possessed a license permitting him to sell liquor lawfully.
65
Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 61 S.
Ct. 552 (1941).
66
People v. Riley, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946) 64 N.Y.S. 348. Compare Ladner v.
Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 148 A. 699 (1930), in which defendant was prevented from
operating a garage for the tenants of apartments which he owned.
67
The decision in People v. Riley, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946) 64 N.Y.S. 348, could
also be justified on the ground that the statutory injunction procedure is very much
like a criminal prosecution, and that no other method had been provided for the grant
of the pardon. See 45 HARV. L. REv. 1096 (1932) on statutory injunctions as a
substitute for criminal proceedings.
68
Jackson Grain Co. v. Lee, 139 Fla. 93, 190 S. 464 (1939), same case 150 Fla.
232, 7 S. (2d) 143 (1942). See also Sheehan v. Osborne, (Cal. 1902) 69 P. 842.
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A plaintiff should be protected in the enjoyment of his benefits
under an injunction so long as he is entitled to them, but the principle
· of res judicata should not be applied mechanically to continue a restraint which works serious hardship on the defendant and which the
plaintiff should not have standing in his favor under prevailing conditions. A strong showing may be required of the defendant, and the
case may be reviewed more closely on appeal than is usual in equity
proceedings,69 but a modification should be permitted whenever the
balancing of the interests of the parties dembnstrates that the injunctive
restraints should no longer be applied. Though free use of the power
to modify may jeopardize the finalty of equity adjudications, still it
is necessary that control be retained as to decrees which regulate conduct in the indefinite and unforeseeable future.
·
Chfi-rles B. Blackmar, S.Ed.
69

In United States v. Swift and Co., 286 U.S. 106, 52 S. Ct. 460 (1932) the
Supreme Court split. four to two on whether modification should have been granted
on the facts presented: If such a conflict arose in an ordinary suit in equity the
appellate court might be inclined to accept the findings of fact made by the trial court.

